Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles and the Supreme Court from Carroll to Cardwell: Inconsistently through the Seamless Web by West, Michael D.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 53 | Number 4 Article 5
4-1-1975
Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles
and the Supreme Court from Carroll to Cardwell:
Inconsistently through the Seamless Web
Michael D. West
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael D. West, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles and the Supreme Court from Carroll to Cardwell: Inconsistently through
the Seamless Web, 53 N.C. L. Rev. 722 (1975).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol53/iss4/5
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
IlI. CONCLUSION
In situations in which the excess business holdings of the private
foundation are stock interests in closely held corporations, redemption
provides the most attractive means for complying with section 4943
without the threat of equity interests passing to third persons. Unfor-
tunately, since a corporation often will be a disqualified person vis-a-
vis the foundation, any redemption must conform to one of the pro-
visions providing relief from self-dealing taxation. If the redeeming
corporation desires to redeem the stock in exchange for appreciated
property, section 101(1)(2)(B) of the Tax Reform Act in conjunction
with section 311 (d) (2) (A) appears to be the best alternative. Regard-
less of the approach adopted, it is clear that a problem exists for many
private foundations and that to avoid penalty taxation under chapter 42
these foundations must have some awareness of the restrictive provis-
ions and a firm grasp of the options available.
DAVID R. FRANKSTONE
Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles and the
Supreme Court From Carroll to Cardwell: Inconsistently
Through the Seamless Web
I. INTRODUCTION
The automobile, originally recognized only as a new and more
rapid mode of transportation, has in modern America become a status
symbol, a repository of effects, and an extension of its owner's person-
ality. As society placed an increasingly personal value on the auto-
mobile, it was transformed from a simple tool of conveyance to an ac-
cepted place of privacy. This change has been reflected in the United
States Supreme Court's inconsistent treatment of warrantless searches
and seizures of automobiles.' As a result of this inconsistency, law en-
forcement officers, who frequently must conduct warrantless auto-
mobile searches and seizures, and the courts that must judge the
propriety of their actions, are forced to seek guidance from a "branch
1. See, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (5-4 plurality decision);
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (5-4 decision); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443 (1971) (5-4 plurality decision); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967)
(5-4 decision).
722 [Vol. 53
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
of the law [which] is something less than a seamless web."2
Automobiles may be seized and searched by law enforcement of-
ficers for many reasons and under an infinite variety of circumstances.
However, warrantless searches and seizures are conducted most fre-
quently in three situations. First, policemen may wish to seize and
search a vehicle for the purpose of discovering contraband or evidence
of a crime. Since automobiles are "effects" within the fourth amend-
ment,3 such police action is subject to the general proscription against
"unreasonable" searches and seizures.4 Searches and seizures of this
type, however, may be made consistent with the fourth amendment,
even without a warrant, when both exigent circumstances and probable
cause to believe that the car will yield contraband or evidence of a
crime exist.5
A second situation in which police frequently seize and search
automobiles occurs when they make a lawful custodial arrest 6 of the
driver or owner while he is inside or close to his vehicle. In such a
case the police may conduct an immediate evidentiary search of the
car at the site of arrest, or they may seize the vehicle and tow it to
an impoundment lot or garage where it subsequently is searched. In
either case the police may later seek to justify the warrantless search,
not on the grounds of probable cause plus exigent circumstances,7 but
on the basis that the search was one made incidental to the lawful ar-
rest.8 This second type of automobile search and seizure invokes the
2. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440 (1973).
3. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, bouses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S.
CONsT. amend. IV.
4. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
5. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 589-96 (1974); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 460 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970). "Evidence"
within this rule includes, of course, fruits and instrumentalities of the crime and contem-
plates that the car itself, as well as its contents, may in a given case fall into one of
these "seizable" categories. See, e.g., Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967). This
broad reading of "evidence" is also consistent with the Supreme Court's rejection of the
distinction between "mere evidence" and contraband for search and seizure purposes.
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 302-06 (1967).
6. "Lawful custodial arrest" here refers to an arrest, made upon probable cause,
in which the arrestee is actually taken into physical custody by police, as opposed to
an arrest in which the offender is not taken into actual custody, as in the case of a cita-
tion for a speeding violation. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
7. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
8. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
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general incidental-search-to-a-lawful-arrest exception to the fourth
amendment warrant requirement. Although the Supreme Court has
frequently dealt with this exception,' it has not squarely addressed
the issue of the permissible scope of the search-incident exception with
respect to searches and seizures of automobiles. As a result, recent
Court decisions defining the permissible scope of searches of the
premises"0 and person" of the arrestee incidental to his arrest may not
be precisely applied to automobile search law.'
A third frequently recurring category of warrantless automobile
searches is that in which police seize, impound, and subsequently
search a vehicle for benign, non-evidentiary purposes. Such benign
purposes include removing a disabled or abandoned vehicle from the
highway when it constitutes a nuisance, 3 towing an automobile after
a parking violation,1 4 preparing a vehicle for forfeiture,"' and impound-
ing a car and removing its contents to a safe place after the driver's
arrest to protect the arrestee's property from damage or theft while he
is in custody. 10 This category of warrantless "inventory" automobile
9. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974); United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Preston v. United States,
376 U.S. 364 (1964); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), overruled, Chi-
mel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948),
overruled, United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Harris v. United States, 331
U.S. 145 (1947), overruled, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); United States
v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931);
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20
(1925); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
10. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
11. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
12. Compare Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) (search of car at sta-
tion house after occupants' arrests too remote in time and place to be incident to arrest)
and Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (search of car at station house
after owner's arrest not incident to arrest), with Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58
(1967) (search at station house after occupants arrest upheld despite facts analogous to
Preston) and Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (search conducted of arrestee's
car while still at scene of arrest but substantial period of time after arrestee taken into
custody and separated from car upheld as incidental to arrest). See generally Chambers
v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
13. See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrows-ki, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Mozzetti v. Superior Ct.,
4 Cal. 3d 699, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1971).
14. See, e.g., People v. Sullivan, 29 N.Y.2d 69, 272 N.E.2d 464, 323 N.Y.S.2d 945
(1971).
15. See, e.g., Cooper v. California, 387 U.S. 58 (1967); Derby v. Cupp, 302 F.
Supp. 686 (D. Ore. 1969).
16. See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Harris v. United States,
390 U.S. 234 (1968) (per curiam). See also United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468(8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Pennington, 441 F.2d 249 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 854 (1971); Mozzetti v. Superior Ct., 4 Cal. 3d 699, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal.
1975] SEARCH AND SEIZURE 725
searches raises important fourth amendment issues.1 7  Although an in-
creasing number of lower federal18 and state 9 courts have addressed
the problem, the Supreme Court has never expressly ruled on the
propriety of any inventory search and seizure.20 Consequently, the
questions of the constitutionality, in the first instance, and the per-
missible scope, of the inventory automobile search and seizure remain
unresolved. As a result, the lower courts remain divided on these is-
sues.
21
The decisions of the Supreme Court dealing with automobile
search and seizure, from Carroll v. United States2 2 to Cardwell v.
Lewis, 21 cannot be satisfactorily harmonized. 24  In seeking what little
consensus there may be in the area and in speculating on the future
of automobile search law, it is helpful to group the cases into the three
broad catgories previously described-probable cause evidentiary
Rptr. 412 (1971); Cabbler v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 520, 184 S.E.2d 781, cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1073 (1971).
17. See, e.g., Comment, Police Inventories of the Contents of Vehicles and the Ex-
clusionary Rule, 29 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 197 (1972).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Kelehar, 470 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Mitchell, 458 F.2d 960 (9th
Cir. 1972); United States v. Pennington, 441 F.2d 249 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
845 (1971); United States ex rel. Clark v. Mulligan, 347 F. Supp. 989 (D.NJ. 1972);
Dodge v. Turner, 274 F. Supp. 285 (D. Utah 1967). See also Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 537
(1973).
19. See, e.g., Boulet v. State, 17 Ariz. App. 64, 495 P.2d 504 (1972); Mozzetti v.
Superior Ct., 4 Cal. 3d 699, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1971); State v. All, 17
N.C. App. 284, 193 S.E.2d 770, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973); State v. Hock, 54
N.J. 526, 257 A.2d 699 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 930 (1970) (dictum); People
v. Sullivan, 29 N.Y.2d 69, 272 N.E.2d 464, 323 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1971); State v. Criscola,
21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 517 (1968); Cabbler v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 520, 184
S.E.2d 781, cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1073 (1971). See also Annot., supra note 18.
20. However, the Court has considered cases involving police action approximating
that observed in inventory searches and seizures. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S.
433 (1973) (disabled vehicle of drunken driving arrestee towed from highway accident
scene to impound lot and searched for incapacitated driver's gun pursuant to "standard
police procedure"); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (per curiam) (vehicle
of arrested robbery suspect towed to police impound lot and inventoried pursuant to re-
quirements of written police department regulation); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58
(1967) (vehicle of drug arrestee searched in course of preparing vehicle for forfeiture
pursuant to state forfeiture statute); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) (ve-
hicle of vagrancy arrestee towed to police station and subsequently searched).
21. Compare United States v. Kelehar, 470 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1972) and People
v. Sullivan, 29 N.Y.2d 69, 272 N.E.2d 464, 323 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1971), with Williams
v. United States, 412 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1969) and Mozzetti v. Superior Ct., 4 Cal.
3d 499, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1971).
22. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
23. 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
24. Of the three most recent Supreme Court decisions in the area, two have been
plurnlity opinions. Id.; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). The third
"-;-ed a bare majority of one vote. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
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searches under exigent circumstances; searches incident to the arrest
of the driver or occupants of the vehicle; and benign purpose inventory
searches for non-evidentiary purposes.2 5
II. WARRANTLESS EViDENTIARY AUTOMOBILE SEARCH
AND SEIZURE
A. The "Automobile Exception" and the Concept of Mobility
During the early 1920's lower federal courts struggled to develop
criteria for dealing with warrantless searches and seizures of auto-
mobiles believed to be transporting illegal liquor.20 While a majority
of these courts found such searches consistent with the fourth amend-
ment, 7 the grounds upon which these decisions rested were hardly
consistent,28 and in fact often raised additional constitutional conflicts.2"
Some of these problems were soon resolved, however, in Carroll v.
United States.30
In Carroll the Supreme Court for the first time addressed the con-
25. Eliminated from specific treatment are "special" types of automobile searches,
such as "border searches," those made pursuant to the consent of the vehicle's owner
or occupant, and searches and seizures made by private citizens.
26. Congress, as part of the National Prohibition Act, statutorily authorized fed-
eral agents to search without a warrant movable vehicles suspected of carrying contra-
band spirits. Ch. 85, tit. H, § 26, 41 Stat. 315 (1919) (repealed 1935).
27. See Miles & Wefing, The Automobile Search and the Fourth Amendment, 4
SETON HALL L. REv. 105, 112 (1972).
28. All but a minority of the early lower federal court decisions treated the valid-
ity of a warrantless automobile search as dependent on the legality of an "arrest," either
of the vehicle itself or of its occupants. E.g., Lambert v. United States, 282 F. 413 (9th
Cir. 1922); United States v. Rembert, 284 F. 996 (S.D. Tex. 1922). A minority of
these courts justified the searches simply as authorized by the statutory scheme of the
Prohibition Act. E.g., Park v. United States, 294 F. 776 (1st Cir. 1924). A very few
of these courts, perhaps anticipating the Supreme Court's decision in Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), ruled that the mobility of the automobile might, in certain
circumstances, obviate the "usual formality of procuring a search warrant." Ash v.
United States, 299 F. 277, 278-79 (4th Cir. 1924). This infant mobility doctrine was,
however, the definite exception rather than the rule, and for the most part it remained,
until Carroll, a largely undeveloped fourth justification for warrantless automobile
searches.
29. The early treatment of warrantless automobile searches as dependent upon
some type of legal arrest conflicted with the rule against warrantless misdemeanor arrest
absent an offense actually committed in the presence of the police officer. See, e.g.,
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 164-65 (1925) (McReynolds, J., dissenting);
Park v. United States, 294 F. 776, 784 (1st Cir. 1924) (Anderson, J., dissenting); Sny-
der v. United States, 285 F. 1, 2 (4th Cir. 1922). Since nearly all of the early cases
involved searches conducted on the basis of information secured through means other
than the officer's own observations, they could not be sustained, if indeed they were de-
pendent on the validity of the arrest of the occupant or the vehicle. Miles & Wefing,
supra note 27, at 114-15.
30. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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stitutionality of a warrantless seizure and search of an automobile. In
December 1921 two federal undercover agents stopped a vehicle sus-
pecting it to contain contraband liquor. Defendant Carroll and one
Kilo were in the car. Since the agents had not seen them in possession
of contraband liquor, no misdemeanor had then been committed in
their presence, and the officers had no authority to arrest Carroll and
Kilo.31 Nevertheless the agents searched the car and discovered more
than sixty bottles of liquor, whereupon they arrested Carroll and Kilo.
In upholding the search, the Court clearly indicated that the pro-
tections of the fourth amendment extended to automobiles.3" At the
same time, however, it emphasized that, for fourth amendment pur-
poses, there was a "necessary difference" between the search of a
stationary structure like a house and the search of a vehicle which has
been stopped on the open road, "where it is not practicable to secure
a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. 31 3 This was a case
where "seizure was impossible except without a warrant." 34 Further-
more, the Court rejected the argument that the validity of the search
depended on the right to arrest. Rather, the legality of the search
turned on the existence of probable cause to believe the car contained
contraband liquor.36
The Court in Carroll thus recognized a new exception to the war-
rant requirement independent of any arrest-the probable cause-
movable automobile search exception. To invoke the exception, a
two-prong test had to be met. First, there had to be probable cause
to search. Secondly, the element of actual ready mobility had to exist
at the time of the stop and search. Neither probable cause nor mobility
alone would suffice.36
The requirement that there be actual mobility at the time of the
search narrowly confined the newly enunciated exception. Under this
branch of the test, "a vehicle is not movable . . . merely because it
. . . has wheels, or is capable of being moved."37 Rather, it is mov-
3 1. See note 29 supra.
32. "[Ihe maxim that 'a man's home is his castle' does not include the full scope
of the Fourth Amendment. It likewise protects the persons, and effects, wherever they
may be, against unreasonable searches and seizures." 267 U.S. at 140.
33. Id. at 153.
34. Id. at 156.
35. Id. at 158-59.
36. Id. at 153-54, 156.
37. Murray & Aitken, Constitutional Limitations on Automobile Searches, 3 LOY-
OLA U. OF L.A.L. REv. 95, 101 (1970).
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able only when the circumstances make it truly impracticable to obtain
a warrant.3 8 In short, the practicability of obtaining a warrant was
made the measure of the Carroll exception. Thus, although the Court
did draw a constitutional distinction between cars and houses, it
"[did] not declare a field day for the police in searching automo-
biles. 39 Rather, the Court in Carroll indicated that if a warrant could
be practicably obtained, it had to be used.4 0
The Carroll standard of probable cause plus mobility as an exigent
circumstance obviating the necessity of obtaining a warrant should be
considered in light of the fact that the "reasonableness" clause of the
fourth amendment implies a balancing of the interests involved in each
case.41 Furthermore, since "'[e]xigent circumstances' implies not just
a police need, but a police need sufficient to override the claims of the
private citizen," 42 the determination of when "exigent circumstances"
exist and are sufficient to excuse compliance with the warrant require-
ment "demands the same balancing of interests as the standard of
reasonableness requires. 43
In Carroll the interest of the agents clearly was their desire to
search for and seize contraband liquor, 4 and the interest of the driver,
although not clearly defined by the Court, apparently was his freedom
to travel on the public roads without interference. 4r Balancing these
interests, the Court concluded that the agent's need for immediate
seizure of contraband concealed in a moving vehicle outweighed the
driver's interest in unimpeded movement.48 While it has been argued
that Carroll, when viewed in this light, presented only the fourth
38. Id.
39. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269 (1973).
40. 267 U.S. at 156.
41. Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
42. Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 HARV. L. REv.
835, 836 (1974). See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973),
where the Court states: 'The needs of law enforcement stand in constant tension with
the Constitution's protections of the individual against certain exercises of official power.
It is precisely the predictability of these pressures that counsels a resolute loyalty to con-
stitutional safeguards." Id. at 273. See also Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523,
533 (1967).
43. Note, 87 HARv. L. PEv., supra note 42, at 836.
44. 267 U.S. at 156.
45. Id. at 153-54, where the Court noted: "IT]hose lawfully within the country,
entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free passage without interruption or
search unless there is known to a competent official authorized to search, probable
cause. .
46. Analogous are the "stop and frisk cases," illustrated by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968), which uphold a stop and frisk of a pedestrian on less than probable cause.
[Vol. 53
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amendment issue of the validity of the seizure of the driver's person,
which was accomplished by stopping the car,4 7 this view relegates
Carroll to the same dependent-on-arrest posture of most of the lower
federal court automobile search cases decided before Carroll"' and
completely ignores the Court's repeated emphasis in Carroll that the
warrantless auto-search doctrine existed independent of the incidental
search exception.49
Nevertheless, Carroll, by phrasing the driver's interest in terms of
freedom of movement, apparently overlooked the possibility that other
interests might be implicated in the prearrest stop and search. This
is due in part to the fact that, when Carroll was decided, the automobile
was a relatively new invention, the primary value of which was its use
as a tool for motion. As the car became more widely accepted, society
began to place a less neutral value on it and on the expectations and
rights as to its use, and began to view the automobile as an expected
place of privacy. 0 With this expectation came the recognition that
warrantless prearrest seizures and searches of automobiles not only in-
truded upon the driver's freedom of movement, but also involved two
other interests--control over his property, and the privacy or secrecy
of the items within the car. 51 The manner in which the Supreme Court
has weighed these diverse interests against the police need to search,
particularly in its struggle to apply-the Carroll doctrine to post-arrest
search situations, is the primary reason for the sporadic growth of
modem automobile search law.52
The birth and early growth53 of the Carroll doctrine coincided
with the first applications of the federal fourth amendment exclusionary
rule enunciated by the Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States. 4
47. See, e.g., Note, 87 HA~v. L. REV., supra note 42, at 838-40.
48. See, e.g., Lambert v. United States, 282 F. 413 (9th Cir. 1922); United States
v. Rembert, 284 F. 996 (S.D. Tex. 1922).
49. See text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.
50. Note, 87 HARv. L. REv., supra note 42, at 840 n.28.
51. Id. at 841.
52. Compare Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), with Chambers v. Ma-
roney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
53. In the first fifteen years after Carroll the Supreme Court on three different
occasions reaffirmed and expanded the warrantless automobile search exception. Brine-
gar v. United States, 338 U.S. 169 (1949); zcher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938);
Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931). In so doing the Court extended the Car-
roll mobility concept to include vehicles that could be considered mobile although mo-
tionless when probable cause to search them first arose. Husty v. United States, supra.
Moreover, the Court also applied the exception to cases which involved no statutory au-
thorization for the search. Brinegar v. United States, supra; Scher v. United States, su-
pra.
54. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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Since the exclusionary rule was not applicable to the states, it is not
surprising that the cases involving the Carroll rule that reached the Su-
preme -Court during this time almost exclusively dealt with searches
made by federal officers. Consequently, the Carroll doctrine during
its early existence probably had relatively little effect on automobile
searches and seizures conducted by state law enforcement officials.
This was, however, not to remain the case.
B. Modern Automobile Search Law
The Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio" extended the Weeks fourth
amendment exclusionary rule to the states. The application of this rule
to the states greatly complicated auto search law, for state law enforce-
ment officials now had to conduct their searches and seizures in a man-
ner consistent with the fourth amendment. Furthermore, state courts
have had to apply the standards of these guaranties to police actions
that are often far different from the investigatory and regulatory work
of federal authorities. 56 As a result, all of the "modem" Supreme
Court automobile search cases have involved searches by state or local
authorities. 1
In Preston v. United States,5" the Supreme Court gave the automo-
bile search doctrine its first post-Mapp inspection. Police received an
early-morning complaint that three men had been seen sitting in a
parked car for five hours in the business district. Investigating officers
found Preston and two companions seated in the parked car. Believing
the men to be indigent, and receiving an inadequate explanation for
their extended presence in the area at that time of night, police placed
the men under arrest for vagrancy. No immediate search was made
of the car at the scene of the arrest. Instead, the police had the arrest-
ees' vehicle towed to the police station and then impounded in a gar-
55. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Overruling its earlier decision in Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949) and applying its reasoning through the fourteenth amendment to
the states, the Supreme Court held that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures
in violation of the Constitution is ... inadmissible in a state court." Id. at 655.
56. See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Cooper v. California,
386 U.S. 58 (1967).
57. Miles & Wefing, supra note 27, at 119. The "modem" car search cases, for
the purposes of this comment, are those considered by the Supreme Court since its deci-
sion extending the fourth amendment exclusionary rule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio,
307 U.S. 643 (1961). The remainder of this comment will be devoted mainly to discus-
sion and analysis of these cases, in terms of the Carroll probable cause-exigent circum-
stances rule, the search-incident-to-arrest-warrant exception, and the benign purpose-in-
ventory search and seizure.
58. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
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age. A thorough search of the car several hours later revealed evi-
dence which led to Preston's conviction on a federal charge of
conspiracy to rob a bank.59
Faced in Preston for the first time with the question of the validity
of a warrantless search made of an automobile at a later time and dif-
ferent place than that of the arrest, a unanimous Court, reaffirming the
applicability of the fourth amendment to auto searches, held the search
unreasonable and reversed Preston's conviction.60 The reasoning of
the Court was, however, less than clear. The Court first declared the
search was too remote in time and place to be incident to Preston's
arrest,61 but nowhere did the majority opinion by Mr. Justice Black re-
fer to the Court's statement in Carroll that the validity of a warrantless
vehicle search otherwise within the scope of the Carroll rule did not
depend on the legality of any arrest. 2  If the Court thus was trying
to distinguish Carroll, it could have done so much more satisfactorily
in any of three ways. First, the Court could have narrowly read Carroll
as having approved only a warrantless search pursuant to statutory
authorization. Secondly, the Court could have emphasized that at the
time of the search, Preston's car was under police control at a garage
and therefore the mobility factor required by Carroll was not present
in Preston. Finally, the Court simply could have treated the search
as having been made without probable cause.63 Instead of clearly rest-
ing his decision on the inapplicability of Carroll due to the lack of
probable cause or exigent circumstances, however, Mr. Justice Black
assumed the existence of probable cause,6 4 and then, despite reference
to the less stringent warrant requirements for vehicle searches,6 5
treated the case as one of search incident to arrest.66  The incident-
59. Id. at 364-66.
60. Id. at 366-68.
61. Id. at 368.
62. See text accompanying notes 32-35 supra.
63. Miles & Wefing, supra note 27, at 120.
64. 376 U.S. at 367-68.
65. Id. at 366-67, citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925):
"[Q]uestions involving searches of motorcars or other things readily moved cannot be
treated as identical to questions arising out of searches of fixed structures like houses.
[ . . What may be an unreasonable search of a house may be reasonable in the case
of a motorcar."
66. 376 U.S. at 367-68. Even assuming probable cause to search at the arrest
scene, the Court stated that "this does not decide the question of the reasonableness of
a search at a later time and at another place"; indeed, the search took place only after
police had arrested the occupants of the car and towed it to the garage, at which time
there was no danger that any weapons in the car might be turned on the police, no dan-
ger that any evidence in the car could be destroyed, and no danger that the car could
be moved out of the jurisdiction. Id. at 368. However, these references to the lack
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to-arrest posture in which Preston was decided seemed to once again
inject into auto search law the idea that the validity of automobile
searches was somehow dependent on a valid arrest.67
Three years later the Court brought still more confusion to the
area when it contradicted its Preston rationale in Cooper v. California.
Police arrested Cooper on a drug charge after he sold narcotics to a
police informer. Acting pursuant to a state statute that authorized the
impoundment and forfeiture of any vehicle used in transporting
drugs, 69 the police took possession of Cooper's car. One week later,
while the vehicle was still in the police garage, a warrantless search
of it was conducted. The search produced heroin that was subse-
quently used against the defendant at his trial.70
In a five-to-four decision, the Court upheld the search as reasonable
under all the circumstances, 7' but as in Preston, the opinion failed to
produce a clear basis for the decision. The Court held on one hand
that Preston was not controlling 72 and then attempted to distinguish
Preston on two grounds. First, in Preston the search was too remote
in time and place to be justified as incident to the driver's arrest, and
there was no nexus between the purpose of the search, the reason for
the arrest and the seizure of the car. In Cooper, however, although
it was conceded by the State that the search was not incident to the
arrest of Cooper,73 the police were required by law to seize and retain
defendant's car because of the crime for which he had been arrested,
and the "subsequent search . . . was closely related to the reason peti-
tioner was arrested, the reason his car had been impounded, and the
reason it was being retained. '74  While lawful custody of the vehicle
could not in itself automatically justify the later warrantless search of
the vehicle in Cooper, "the reason for and nature of the custody...
constitutionally [justified] the search."75 This sounds much like a con-
of exigent circumstances and the absence of the mobility factor present in Carroll came
almost as an afterthought, and were clearly secondary to the Court's primary holding
that the search was not incident to Preston's arrest.
67. See note 29 supra.
68. 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
69. Act of April 7, 1939, ch. 60, § 11611, [1939] CAL. LAWS 767, as amended,
Act of Feb. 23, 1940, ch. 9, § 34, [1941] CAL. LAWS 23 (repealed 1972). Interestingly,
while the statute provided for the seizure and retention of the vehicle until a forfeiture
was declard or a release ordered, it nowhere authorized any search of it.
70. 386 U.S. at 58-59.
71. Id. at 61-62.
72. Id. at 61.
73. Id. at 60.
74. Id. at 61.
75. Id.
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clusion that the police had probable cause to search the car. Closely
related to the first basis for distinguishing Preston was the second. In
Preston the police arrested the defendant for vagrancy, a charge that
gave them no authority to impound or retain custody of defendant's
car.76 Rather, his car was towed to the station house merely as a con-
venience to him. In Cooper, however, the police were statutorily
authorized to seize the defendant's car because of the very charge on
which he was taken into custody. Moreover, the statute in Cooper en-
titled the police to retain custody of the car superior to any claim to
it by the defendant or anyone sent by him to claim it.77
An alternative ground for upholding the search in Cooper, and
another basis for distinguishing Preston was the Court's statement that
"[i]t would be unreasonable to hold that the police, having to retain
the car. . . had no right, even for their own protection, to search it."'78
This observation, however, is unrelated to the prior emphasis placed
upon the relationship between the reason for the arrest, and the seizure
and search of the automobile. 79 This is true even though the police
first could have obtained a warrant but failed to do so, because "'It]he
relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant,
but whether the search was reasonable.' "80
Cooper had the ultimate effect of reaffirming the basic "auto-
mobile exception" created in Carroll. But in upholding a search where
it could scarcely be said to have been impracticable to obtain a warrant,
a new permissiveness toward warrantless searches of automobiles far
beyond anything discernible in Carroll was exhibited. Although it is
possible to read the holding in Cooper as merely justifying a self-pro-
tective warrantless search by police of an automobile which by statute
they are required to impound pending forfeiture proceedings,81 the lan-
guage of the opinion more broadly suggests that anytime there is a close
nexus that passes muster under the general fourth amendment reason-
ableness test the search will be upheld even when the circumstances
clearly would have allowed the securing of a warrant. 82
76. Id. at 60.
77. Id. at 61.
78. Id. at 61-62 (emphasis added).
79. See text accompanying notes 73-77 supra.
80. 386 U.S. at 62, quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950).
81. 386 U.S. at 61-62.
82. This broader interpretation of Cooper is supported further by the fact that the
California forfeiture statute did not give the police the right to search cars seized pursu-
ant to its seizure provisions. See note 69 supra. Moreover, it is difficult to justify a
search not conducted until a week after the vehicle is impounded as necessary self-pro-
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Within two years, the Supreme Court in Preston and Cooper had
announced two irreconcilable car search doctrines. Such decisional
discord continued in the near future.83 In the year after Cooper, how-
ever, the Court decided a case that provided a few clarifications.
In Dyke v. Taylor Implement Manufacturing Co.,84 a shot was
fired from a passing car at the home of one of the Taylor Company's
non-striking employees, in violation of a county court injunction issued
in connection with a local labor dispute. A deputy sheriff pursued a
"suspicious car" that sped away but was ultimately stopped by police
in another town. The occupants were arrested, apparently for reckless
driving, and were taken to the station house. Their car was parked
outside on the street, presumably as a convenience to the owner.
Police officers noticed what appeared to be a fresh bullet hole in the
car, whereupon they proceeded to make a warrantless search of the
vehicle. A rifle was discovered under the seat and was subsequently
introduced as evidence against the defendants in a prosecution for
criminal contempt, which resulted in their conviction.8"
The Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice White, found the search
could not be justified on the basis of any prior auto search law. The
search was no more incidental to arrest here than in Preston, and
Cooper was inapplicable because there was no indication that the police
had impounded the car, that there was any statute authorizing them
to do so, or that the search was related to the purposes of any such
custody other than the convenience of the owner.86 Finally, while re-
affirming the Carroll exception, the Court pointed out that the Carroll
line of cases "always insisted that the officers conducting the search
have 'reasonable or probable cause' to believe that they will find the
instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime before they
begin their warrantless search. 87  In Dyke, no such probable cause
tective action by police, even if the forfeiture statute is interpreted as giving police a
possessory interest in, and a corollary right to search, the car. See Note, 87 HAalv. L.
REv., supra note 42, at 847, 852. For further general discussion of Cooper as a protec-
tive or benign purpose inventory search see notes 199-201 and accompanying text infra.
83. Compare Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), with Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). See also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
84. 391 U.S. 216 (1968). Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968), decided
just prior to Dyke, will be discussed in the context of inventory searches. See text ac-
companying notes 202-06 infra.
85. 391 U.S, at 217-19, 221.
86. Id. at 220-21. "The case . . . is like Preston and unlike Cooper according to
each of the distinguishing tests set forth in the Cooper opinion." Id. at 221.
87. Id.
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existed, and thus the search could not be sustained under the Carroll
doctrine. 88
Thus, Dyke confirmed that Preston survived Cooper.89 More
importantly, for the first time since Carroll the Court in Dyke clearly
distinguished the incident-to-arrest rule, which constituted the basis of
Preston, and the automobile exception to the warrant requirement,
which provides the authority to conduct a warrantless automobile
search on the basis of probable cause, that was developed by the Court
in Carroll.90
Amid the confusion that abounded in the aftermath of the Su-
preme Court decisions in Preston and Cooper, the potential for clarity
held out by the decision in Dyke was lost in the state and lower federal
courts-the tendency remained to abandon the distinction between
these conflicting Supreme Court decisions and to treat all post-arrest
automobile searches as incidental to the occupants' arrest.9 1 Following
the Supreme Court's decision in Chimel v. California,92 which dras-
tically curtailed the permissible scope of searches incidental to arrest,
these lower courts faced a situation in which many warrantless searches
previously valid even under Preston now appeared illegal and in which
Cooper, once cleverly used to circumvent the Preston restraints, now
could be viewed as limited to its facts.9 3 Ironically, despite the appar-
ent culmination in Chimel of the Court's recent moves to restrict war-
rantless searches, 94 the Carroll doctrine was squarely reaffirmed in that
very decision. 95 With the doors slammed tighter on warrantless auto
88. Id. at 221-22.
89. Id. at 220. Mr. Justice Douglas had suggested just prior to Dyke in his con-
currence in Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968), that Preston which he felt
had been overruled sub silentio by Cooper, had been resurrected by the majority's deci-
sion in Harris. Id. at 236-37.
90. 391 U.S. at 220-22.
91. See, e.g., United States v. Barnett, 418 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1969); Common-
wealth v. Cockfield, 431 Pa. 639, 246 A.2d 381 (1968). But see People v. Jones, 38
Ill. 2d 427, 231 N.E.2d 580 (1967); State v. Fish, 280 Minn. 156, 159 N.W.2d 786
(1968).
92. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
93. See Miles & Wefing, supra note 27, at 124. For a fuller discussion of the inci-
dent-to-arrest doctrine insofar as it relates to warrantless searches and seizures of auto-
mobiles see text accompanying notes 202-06 infra.
94. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), decided shortly before
Dyke, where the Court read the fourth amendment as protecting people and their reason-
able expectations of privacy, rather than places. See also Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S.
30 (1970), which followed Chimel by a year and, along with Preston, Dyke, Katz, and
Chimel, seemed to point to a full-scale war on warrantless searches. See generally Com-
ment, Auto Search: The Rocky Road From Carroll to Coolidge, 17 S.D.L. REv. 98
(1972).
95. "Our holding today is ...entirely consistent with the recognized principle
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searches after Chimel than ever before, the stage was set for some sur-
prising results as the Court prepared to consider the question, posed
but left unanswered in Dyke, "whether Carroll and Brinegar. . . ex-
tend to a warrantless search, based upon probable cause, of an automo-
bile which, having been stopped originally on a highway, is parked out-
side a courthouse." 96
C. Chambers and Coolidge-At the Crossroads
In Chambers v. Maroney17 decided soon after Chimel, the Court
dispelled the notion that Chimel constituted a "potential roadblock to
vehicle searches. ' 8  Following a late night robbery of a gas station,
police were informed by witnesses that four men, one of whom was
wearing a green sweater, had committed the robbery and fled in a sta-
tion wagon, which was also described. A short time later, policemen
spotted a car matching the description of the one used in the robbery
and stopped it in a dark parking lot. One of the four occupants, Cham-
bers, was wearing a green sweater. Police arrested all of the occupants
of the car and drove the car to the police station. A search of the car
produced evidence that was used to convict the defendants of rob-
bery. 9 The Supreme Court upheld the search." 0
The Court began by conceding that the search could not be justi-
fied as incidental to the defendant's arrest, citing Preston and Dyke.
Nor could it be sustained under Cooper, for no claim of statutory
authorization for holding the car as evidence was made.' 0' The Court
held, however, that the officers did have probable cause to search the
car when they first encountered it.1 2  Thus turning to the Carroll doc-
trine, the Court reaffirmed the distinction drawn there between
searches of houses and searches of cars, for purposes of the fourth
amendment, and then addressed "[t]he question . . .whether probable
cause justifies a warrantless search in the circumstances presented.""' °
that, assuming the existence of probable cause, automobiles . . . may be searched with-
out warrants 'where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.'"
395 U.S. at 764 n.9, quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
96. 391 U.S. at 222.
97. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
98. Comment, Chimel v. California: A Potential Roadblock to Vehicle Searches,
17 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 626 (1970).
99. 399 U.S. at 44-45.
100. Id. at 52.
101. Id. at 47, 49-50 & n.7.
102. Id. at 47-48.
103. Id. at 50 n.7.
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In short, the Court for the first time squarely faced the issue of whether,
given probable cause, the warrantless search of an automobile, con-
ducted after the arrest of the occupants and while the car was under
police control, could be sustained solely under the Carroll exception.",
The Court concluded that, given probable cause, the search was
justified by the Carroll doctrine. Although there would appear to have
been no exigent circumstances that justified dispensing with the war-
rant requirement in Chambers, Mr. Justice White asserted that "[t]he
probable-cause factor still obtained at the station house and so did the
mobility of the car. . ... -1 The Court gave no explanation for this
conclusion. Perhaps the Court was hypothesizing a situation in which
the arrestee or one in his behalf claimed the car, in which case the
police, absent some statutory authority for holding the car, would be
forced to release it.106 In any event, according to Justice White, the
alternative to an immediate station house search is a warrantless seizure
to strip the automobile of its mobility while a search warrant is ob-
tained. Since both are intrusions incapable of being distinguished in
many cases,'10 7 either course of action is constitutionally permissible
given probable cause. 108
The holding in Chambers contradicts the Carroll requirement that,
even if probable cause exists, a warrant must be used when possible,1
0 9
which would seem to include a situation in which the car was under
police control similar to that in Preston and its occupants under arrest
before the search was conducted. Chambers seems to have modified
the Carroll doctrine so that the mere inherent or potential mobility of
an automobile constitutes an exigent circumstance sufficient to justify
an unwarranted search. This modification would limit Preston to inci-
dental search situations and effectively exempt all automobile searches
from the fourth amendment warrant requirement."10 Such a reading
104. This issue was present, but only secondarily, in Preston and Cooper, and was
not decided directly by the Court in that the cases turned primarily on the application
of the incident-to-arrest and state-forfeiture-statute search rules.
105. 399 U.S. at 52.
106. This is suggested by the Court's statement that the mobility factor continued
at the station "unless the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless seizure of the car
and the denial of its use to anyone until a warrant is secured." Id. (emphasis added).
107. "Arguably, because of the preference for a magistrate's judgment, only the im-
mobilization of the car should be permitted until a search warrant is obtained; arguabry,
only the 'lesser' intrusion is permissible until the magistrate authorizes the 'greater.' But
which is the 'greater' and which the 'lesser' intrusion is itself a debatable question and
the answer may depend on a variety of circumstances." Id. at 51-52.
108. Id. at 52.
109. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925).
110. Thus Chambers dismembered Preston and Dyke and reconstructed them to per-
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of Chambers conflicts with the principles set down in Preston and
Chimel and expands the Carroll automobile exception even further
than did Cooper.1 '
The result in Chambers can more readily be squared with Carroll
by looking at the interests involved. The privacy interests of citizens
protected by the fourth amendment that are involved in automobile
searches include the freedom of movement, control over one's car, and
the secrecy of its contents. The search of a person's car intrudes upon
his social expectation of secrecy, and a seizure of his car invades his
expectation of control. However, the reasonableness of the search and
seizure in the Carroll prearrest situation, and the reasonableness in the
Chambers post-arrest situation, turn upon different configurations of
these interests." 2
In an open-highway, prearrest case like Carroll, a stop followed
by an immediate search results in only a brief detention of the suspect
and a temporary seizure of his car; however, his interest in the secrecy
of the contents of his car is greatly infringed. Alternatively, immobil-
ization of the automobile until a warrant is obtained gives fullest fourth
amendment protection to the secrecy interest, but constitutes a much
greater infringement upon the driver's mobility and control interests.
A consensus of opinion among citizens is unlikely whether the im-
mediate search or the prior immobilization constitutes the greater intru-
sion,1 3 but either will protect the government's interest in preserving
evidence. Furthermore, immobilization will almost alwayg require
greater efforts and possible exposure to danger on the part of police-
men and greater expenditures by the state. Weighing these interests,
it seems reasonable to leave the choice between seizure and immediate
search to the law enforcement officer rather than the driver on the open
highway." 4
In the Chambers post-arrest situation, however, the balancing of
the interests indicates a different result. The driver's mobility and con-
trol interests have already been removed, or reduced by his arrest.
mit a delayed warrantless search, watered down the Carroll mobility factor for dispens-
ing with the warrant requirement in the name of reaffirming that doctrine, and went
beyond even Cooper where, unlike Chambers, the searched car had actually been im-
pounded.
111. See, e.g., Note, Search and Seizure Since Chimel v. California, 55 MINN. L.
REV. 1011, 1027 (1971).
112. Note, 87 HARv. L. REv., supra note 42, at 841, 844.
113. See note 107 supra.
114. Note, 87 HARv. L. REv., supra note 42, at 841-42.
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Thus his major concern at this point is the privacy of the car's contents.
The inconveniences involved in seizing and towing the auto cannot
be avoided by policemen in the post-arrest situation; however, in this
situation, where the driver's secrecy interest may be the only interest
with which he is still concerned, it seems likely that most drivers would
find detention of their car while a warrant is secured preferable to an
immediate search. Hence, it seems here that only immobilization, as
opposed to search, should be reasonable without a warrant. "The re-
sult in Carroll turned on giving the police a choice between an im-
mediate search and what might be a more administratively costly seiz-
ure. Once the car is brought to the station . . . , it would seem that
the police have already made their choice."' 1 5
A final aspect of Chambers that may have influenced the Court's
decision is the fact that the automobile was at least as mobile when
the police initially encountered it in the parking lot as had been the
vehicle in Carroll. Since the police had probable cause to search the
car, Carroll would have justified an immediate warrantless search." 6
Holding that the arrest of the occupants and the removal of the auto-
mobile to the station house invalidated a warrantless search, which
otherwise could have been made without a warrant, would condition
the right of warrantless search on the fortuities of location, time of day,
and whether there were grounds for an arrest. The Court thus held
the arrest to be valid and treated the removal of the car to the police
station as a necessary precaution taken by the police to avoid searching
under dangerous circumstances." 7
Many commentators viewed Chambers as standing for the dual
proposition that the inherent mobility of automobiles would always give
rise to exigent circumstances and therefore all subsequent automobile
searches conducted without a warrant would be reasonable within the
Carroll doctrine, notwithstanding the practicability of obtaining a war-
rant." 8 However, as the Court quickly proved in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire,"9 this was not the case.
Coolidge was arrested on a murder charge, and his wife was told
that the two family cars, which were parked outside in the driveway
of the Coolidge home and visible from both the street and. the house,
115. Id. at 844-45.
116. 399 U.S. at 47-48, 52.
117. Id. at 46, 52 n.10.
118. See, e.g., Note, 55 MINN. L. R1v., supra note 111.
119. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
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were "impounded." Two hours later the vehicles were towed to the
police station, and two days later one of the cars was searched without
a warrant. 120 The search revealed evidence that indicated that the
murder victim likely had been in Coolidge's automobile.' 2'
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Stewart, considered the seiz-
ure and subsequent search in light of the prior automobile search cases
and found that none could be invoked to save the search.1 22 The Court
felt that Preston dictated that the police could not remove and later
search the car without a warrant. Furthermore, the Court refused to
apply Carroll and Chambers to the facts in Coolidge, on the grounds
that to do so would extend them far beyond their original rationale,
which Mr. Justice Stewart construed as being based on the actual mob-
ility of an automobile, initially stopped on the open highway, which
makes it impracticable to secure a warrant. 23  The Coolidge car was
not stopped on the open highway; rather it was seized as it sat parked
in a private driveway when, for practical purposes, it was already under
the effective control of the police and when there was no realistic
chance of flight by the accused or the removal or destruction of evi-
dence, weapons, or contraband which might be inside the vehicle.
There was, in the Court's opinion, simply no exigent circumstance mak-
ing it impracticable to secure a warrant, and thus no basis for invoking
the Carroll doctrine.' 24 "The word 'automobile,"' admonished the
Court, "is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment
fades away and disappears.' 25
Moreover, since Carroll was inapplicable, Chambers did not valid-
ate the search because that case merely stood for the proposition that,
given a right to stop and search a car on the open road under Carroll,
the police could instead seize the vehicle and search it later at the
police station.' 06 Having found that the "'automobile exception'...
120. Strangely enough, Coolidge involved a search conducted pursuant to search
warrants. However, the warrants were invalid because they had been issued by the State
Attorney General, who obviously failed to qualify as a "neutral and detached magis-
trate." Id. at 449-53. Thus the Court treated the search as a warrantless one.
121. Id. at 445-48.
122. Id. at 458-60. The Court also held the incident-to-arrest exception and the
plain view doctrine inapplicable on the facts of Coolidge. Id. at 455-57, 464-73.
123. Id. at 458-60.
124. Id. at 460-62. This part of Court's analysis appears, however, to overlook the
fact that there was evidence that Coolidge's wife wished to move one of the vehicles.
Id. at 447. Unless the police could legally seize the cars, it is therefore arguable that
at least one of them was mobile.
125. Id. at 461-62.
126. Id. at 463.
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[was] simply irrelevant, 127 the Court held that Dyke12s was control-
ling-a rather surprising conclusion in light of the fact that the search
there was invalidated because it was conducted without probable cause,
a factor that did exist in Coolidge. However, in neither Dyke nor Cool-
idge was there any real danger that the car would be moved, an analogy
which the Court found to be controlling.'
2 9
The most notable effect of Coolidge on automobile search law is
theCourt's return to the limited concept of mobility originally enunciated
in the Carroll case. Under the rule of Coolidge, exigent circum-
stances in terms of mobility sufficient to justify a warrantless auto
search apparently exist only when the car is actually moving when it
is seized. To emphasize this fact, the Court clearly stated that the
mere inherent or potential mobility characteristic of all automobiles is
of no constitutional significance.' 10 Furthermore, impracticability as
defined in Coolidge requires a potential for immediate flight of the
automobile or the imminent danger of loss of evidence contained
therein if time is taken to secure a warrant. The Court reaffirmed but
redefined Chambers in terms of these rejuvenated concepts of actual
mobility and genuine impracticability,'' and made it "clear that the
reach of Chambers as a precedent should only extend to cases in which
the initial confrontation between the policeman and the citizen was on
the open highway, with the policeman having probable cause to
search."'' : '-  If Coolidge did not overrule Chambers, it did recast
Chambers as "Carroll after arrest, at the station house."'
33
127. Id. at 462.
128. Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968).
129. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 463-64 (1971).
130. Id. at 461 n.18.
131. "On its face, Chambers purports to deal only with situations in which the po-
lice may legitimately make a warrantless search under Carroll .... The rationale of
Chambers is that given a justified initial intrusion, there is little difference between a
search on the open highway and a later search at the station." Id. at 463 n.20 (em-
phasis by the Court). Thus the Supreme Court refused to read Chambers as extending
the Carroll rule.
132. Note, 87 HARv. L. REV., supra note 42, at 845.
133. Id. With respect to the idea that the initial encounter between the police and
the vehicle must be at least initially justifiable under Carroll, Coolidge emphasized that
there is an important "constitutional difference between stopping, seizing, and searching
a car on the open highway, and entering private property to seize and search an unoccu-
pied, parked vehicle not then being used for any illegal purpose. 403 U.S. at 463 n.20.
This constitutional distinction probably was the essence of Coolidge, and the basic
grounds on which Coolidge distinguished Chambers. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S.
583, 593 (1974).
Due to the frequency with which the need to search automobiles arises in circum-
stances in which a warrant cannot be secured, Mr. Justice White in dissent urged that
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Coolidge appeared to narrow the permissible boundaries of war-
rantless automobile searches to the dimensions which they had been
thought to encompass prior to Cooper'3 4 and Chambers. A strict inter-
pretation of the warrant requirement consistent with Chimel again had
resurfaced. However, the Court did not overrule Cooper and Cham-
bers, thus leaving many questions unanswered in the law of automobile
search and seizure. Two were of paramount importance. One was
under what circumstances a car would acquire, and lose, "mobility" in
a constitutional sense; the other was the nature and applicability of the
warrant requirement as applied to searches of automobiles. With re-
gard to both questions, the Supreme Court after Coolidge was at a
crossroads. Only the future would tell which path-the one suggested
by Chambers or the one preferred by Coolidge-the Court would
take.13 5
D. Beyond the Crossroads--Still a Seamless Web?
In Cardwell v. Lewis 3 ' the Supreme Court for the first time since
Coolidge dealt squarely with the warrantless evidentiary search and
seizure of an automobile based on probable cause. In that case police
arrested the defendant on suspicion of murder and later his car was
seized, without a warrant, from a public commercial parking lot. The
car was towed to the police impoundment lot where the exterior was
examined. The "examination" consisted of comparing the tires of de-
fendant's car with tire tread casts made at the murder scene and the
matching of paint samples taken from defendant's car with those taken
from the car of the decedent. Although police officers had known for
eleven weeks of the probable roles of the defendant and his automobile
all such searches, for the sake of uniformity, be exempt from the warrant requirement,
with probable cause being the sole prerequisite of reasonableness. 403 U.S. at 524-27.
134. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
135. Miles & Wefing, supra note 27, at 132.
136. 417 U.S. 583 (1974). During the period between Coolidge and Cardwell, the
Court decided two cases involving warrantless searches and seizures of automobiles.
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), involved a non-evidentiary search and is
thus best considered in the context of benign purpose inventory searches. See text ac-
companying notes 207-30 infra. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266
(1973), involved primarily the question whether the warrantless search therein consid-
ered could be sustained under a federal immigration statute or the "border search" war-
rant-exception, and will not be treated in this comment.
In addition, the Supreme Court has recently decided two companion cases involving
searches not of automobiles, but of their occupants, incidental to their arrest. Gustafson
v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). The
implications of these cases regarding car search law will be discussed in the context of
automobile searches and the incident-to-arrest doctrine. See text accompanying notes
186-92 infra.
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in the crime, no search warrant was served, either before or after de-
fendant's arrest and the seizure of his car. The defendant was con-
victed and his conviction was affirmed in state courts. He applied for
federal habeas corpus relief and ultimately his case came before the
Supreme Court. In a plurality opinion by Mr. Justice Blackmun, the
Court held that the seizure and "examination" of the car were reason-
able.'a
The Court first addressed the issue of whether there had been a
"search" of defendant's automobile within the terms of the fourth
amendment. Although the holding of the case was equivocal on this
point, 13  the plurality opinion strongly implied that the "examination"
was not a "search."' The Court pointed out that the "examination"
extended only to the exterior of a car which had been left in a public
parking lot, and it relied on Cooper for the proposition that the "exam-
ination" was reasonable because there was probable cause to believe
that the automobile had been used in the commission of the crime for
which defendant was arrested. ' Affirming that the purpose of the
fourth amendment was to protect the privacy interests of individuals,
the Court found the examination of defendant's car invaded no reason-
able expectation which that amendment was designed to insure.' In
any event, insisted the Court, "[o]ne has a lesser expectation of pri-
vacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it
seldom serves as . . . the repository of personal effects.' 42
The Court's suggestion that the examination of defendant's car
was not a search implicating the fourth amendment is inconsistent with
the earlier teaching that "the Fourth Amendment governs all intrusions
by agents of the public upon personal security."' 4  The intrusion here
137. 417 U.S. at 588-96. The opinion of the Court by Mr. Justice Blackmun was
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist. Mr. Justice Stewart
filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall joined. Mr.
Justice Powell filed an opinion concurring in the result.
138. "Under circumstances such as these, where probable cause exists, a warrantless
examination of the exterior of a car is not unreasonable under the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments." ld. at 592 (emphasis added). If by "examination" the Court
means "no search." it seems that the fourth amendment standard of "reasonableness"
would not be relevant. Perhaps the Court is merely suggesting that there was no search,
but if there were, it was reasonable.
139. Throughout this portion of its opinion the Court referred to the inspection of
the car as an "examination," and in fact began with the statement that "[tihe evidence
with which we are concerned is not the product of a 'search' that implicates traditional
considerations of the owner's privacy interest." Id. at 588-89.
140. Id. at 592.
141. Id. at 593; see id. at 591-93.
142. Id. at 590.
143. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17-18 n.15 (1968). See also ALI MODEL CODE
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was not limited to mere observation of the exterior of the automobile.
It included a search of the layers of paint beneath the visible surface
of the vehicle. 144  Furthermore, the Court's reliance on Cooper sug-
gests that, simply because an object is an "instrumentality" of crime,
it can be seized and searched with impunity. The distinction between
"instrumentalities" and other evidence was laid to rest, however, in
Warden v. Hayden.145  Additionally, Cooper involved the search of an
automobile that had been seized pursuant to a state forfeiture statute,
whereas there was no such statutory authority for the impoundment in
Cardwell.
More troubling is the Court's assumption that a citizen enjoys a
lesser expectation of privacy in his automobile simply because it is an
automobile. Such a novel approach is not supported by prior case law
or common experience. It is true that the earlier car search cases dif-
ferentiated between vehicles and fixed objects with respect to the
fourth amendment warrant requirements. 146 However, this distinction
rested upon the greater mobility of the automobile, which when mani-
fested gave rise to exigent circumstances, "not [upon] some inherent
expectation of privacy marking automobiles as second-class effects
under the fourth amendment."' 47  While the automobile in its early
life may have been considered in a neutral sense merely a tool of move-
ment, today it has become an expected place of privacy. 4 " Thus, even
if, as the Court asserts, "'[tihe search of an automobile is ...less in-
trusive on the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment than the
search of one's person or of a building.' -149 it is also true that the fourth
amendment "protects people, not places."''
Regardless of whether there was a "search" in Cardwell, there was
without doubt a warrantless seizure within the meaning of the fourth
OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, art. I, § 1.01(1) (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1970), which
defines an automobile search as "an intrusion under color of authority on an individual's
'vehicle,' 'for the purpose' of seizing things."
144. Lewis v. Cardwell, 354 F. Supp. 26, 35 n.10 (S.D. Ohio 1972), rev'd, 417 U.S.
583 (1974).
145. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
146. Id. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
147. 7 AKRON L. REv. 343, 349 (1974).
148. See Note, 87 HARv. L. REv., supra note 42, at 840 n.28.
149. 417 U.S. at 590, quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 279
(Powell, J., concurring).
150. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). Given this fact, "it becomes
clear that the reach of [the fourth] Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or ab-
sence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure." Id. at 353.
[Vol. 53
SEARCHAND SEIZURE
amendment.' 5 ' To justify this seizure, the Court looked to the "auto-
mobile exception" as expanded in Chambers. Concluding that the
car's exterior could have been searched without a warrant in the park-
ing lot, Mr. Justice Blackmun quoted with approval the language from
Chambers that supported either a seizure or an immediate search of
the automobile and suggested that the probable cause and exigent cir-
cumstances that obtained at the initial spot of encounter with the car
continued at the station house.'52 The "exigent circumstances" relied
on by the Court apparently consisted of the fact that, at the time of
his arrest, the defendant, having left his car in a parking lot open to
public access, was alerted to the police decision to seize his automobile
and therefore the danger arose of its being removed or tampered with
before a warrant could be obtained.' 53
This analysis, however, ignores the fact that for eleven weeks the
defendant had known of the suspicions of the police with regard to him-
self and his car, and yet the police at no time were sufficiently con-
cerned that he would spirit the automobile away to seek a search war-
rant, even though they had probable cause to do so, and in fact did
obtain an arrest warrant. This is inconsistent with a claim that sud-
denly upon defendant's arrest, such an imminent need to search de-
veloped that time could not be taken to secure a warrant from the
magistrate's office that was only minutes away from the police sta-
tion. 15 4  Moreover, Chambers, after Coolidge, clearly stood only for
for the proposition that a warrantless seizure could be made and the
search delayed until a later time and place where the seizure and search
151. Mr. Justice Stewart in dissent felt that the no-search argument was "irrelevant,"
since before the "examination" there had been a seizure. Since the fourth amendment
protects "against 'unreasonable searches and seizures,' the warrantless seizure itself must
first have been justified." 417 U.S. 596, 597-98.
152. Id. at 593-94, quoting Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970).
153. Id. at 590-91, 594-95.
154. See Brief for Respondent at 16, Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974). This
is particularly true in light of the facts that the police at this time had custody of de-
fendant, his car keys, and the parking lot claim check, so that the car was effectively
immobilized; that no confederates were at large; and that no one inclined to move the
car knew of defendant's arrest. Although there was evidence that defendant asked his
attorney at the time of his arrest to see that his wife got the car, the fact remains that
the attorney turned the keys and claim check over to police. Defendant's wife did not
know of his arrest, and he had no way of communicating that fact other than through
his attorney. It can hardly be suggested that defendant's lawyer, an officer of the court,
would, either alone or in conspiracy with anyone else, attempt to move or tamper with
the automobile. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how anyone could disturb the car or
move it off the parking lot without the keys or claim check since the car was in a com-
mercial lot staffed with attendants whose job it was to oversee the automobiles of its
customers.
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initially would have been justifiable under Carroll. In Cardwell the
exigent circumstances of Carroll were absent-there was no fleeing
suspect, no "fleeting opportunity" to search, "no contraband or stolen
goods or weapons," and no confederates.155 Therefore Coolidge, not
Chambers, would seem to have controlled the case.'"0 The plurality
in Cardwell nevertheless followed Chambers and distinguished Cool-
idge.
The grounds on which the Court sought to distinguish Coolidge
basically was that the seizure of the car in Coolidge was made from
private property whereas in Cardwell "the automobile was seized from a
public place where access was not meaningfully restricted.1C 7  While
it is true that this was partly the ground on which Coolidge distinguished
Chambers, it is also true that the search in Coolidge could not be sus-
tained under Carroll, while the search in Chambers could, because in
both Carroll and Chambers the car was in fact actually moving on the
road when seized. Thus the Court's statement, that "[the fact that the
car in Chambers was seized after being stopped on a highway, whereas
[defendant's] car was seized from a public parking lot has little, if any,
legal significance,'"!"' seems, in the circumstances of Cardwell, an un-
convincing basis for reinstating a broader reading of Chambers than
that allowed in Coolidge.
Additionally, the attempt to distinguish Coolidge on the basis of
this "public" versus "private" property rationale seems inconsistent with
Coolidge both factually and legally. The original seizure in Cardwell
took place in an attended commercial parking lot in which defendant
had, in effect, rented a space, locked his car and taken the keys with
him. The purpose of such a parking lot is to provide a place of
security for a customer's automobile away from the vulnerability of
truly public areas. Cardwell correctly states that "'[w]hat a person
knowingly exposes to the public. . . is not a subject of Fourth Amend-
ment protection.' "15 However, it must also be admitted that "what
155. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 462 (1971).
156. For a warrantless search to be justified under the Carroll line of cases, two
conditions must be met. First, it must be shown that a warrant could not have been
obtained in advance. Secondly, it must be clear that there was a real, not merely a prob-
lematical, danger that the evidence would be removed or destroyed if time were taken
to obtain a warrant. See id. at 458-60.
157. 417 U.S. at 593. The Court also referred to the fact that in Coolidge the
search extended into the interior of the vehicle whereas in Cardwell it was limited to
the exterior. Id. at 593 n.9.
158. Id. at 594.
159. Id. at 591, quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected." 160 The Coolidge doctrine simply
would seem not to fit the Court's artificial "public" versus "private" in-
terpretation.
It is difficult to assess the impact that Cardwell will have on auto-
mobile search and seizure law. The "private" versus "public" property
rationale of the case can be read broadly as severely limiting, if not
for practical purposes overruling, the holding in Coolidge. The case
may have at least reinstated Chambers to its pre-Coolidge status, if not
extended that case in the abstract to allow warrantless searches of all
automobiles on probable cause even where they are "mobile" only in
some innate sense. In short, the case could be read as requiring only
minor, if any, "exigency" to allow warrantless seizures and searches of
automobiles when they are not on private property. Furthermore, the
language in the case implying that automobiles are "second class ef-
fects" in terms of reasonable expectations of privacy protectable under
the fourth amendment suggests that the warrant requirement will
henceforth be inapplicable to automobiles, in fact if not in words.
On balance, it seems that greater, not lesser, confusion may be
the result of Cardwell. The case returns the Court to the crossroads
at which it stood after Chambers and Coolidge, leaving Chambers jux-
taposed with not one but two conflicting pluralities, both of which are
equally vague on the still unanswered questions regarding "exigent cir-
cumstances," the mobility factor, and the warrant requirement in the
context of automobile search law. Consequently, the law of probable
cause automobile search and seizure today remains less certain than
when it began with Carroll fifty years ago.
II[. AUTOMOBILE SEARCH AND THE INCIDENT-TO-
ARREST EXCEPTION
A. Background
The most widely recognized exception to the warrant requirement
is the category of searches conducted incidental to a lawful arrest. The
right of law enforcement officials to conduct, and the permissible scope
of such searches, are important to automobile search law because of
the frequency of arrests made in or near automobiles. Searches al-
legedly made incidental to the arrest of the driver of an automobile
may involve searches of the person of the driver or his automobile or
160. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
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both.16 Such incidental searches may be made under circumstances
analogous to those in which "automobile exception" searches are con-
ducted. However, the validity of the true incidental search turns on
the condition precedent of a contemporaneous lawful arrest and the re-
sulting immediate need to search to protect the arresting officer and
prevent the removal or destruction of evidence. In contrast, the valid-
ity of the "automobile exception" search depends on the existence of
probable cause to search the car under exigent circumstances. 10 2
B. History of Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine
The Supreme Court of the United States in dictum first announced
the incidental-search doctrine in 1914 in Weeks v. United States.1' 3
Since then the Court's decisions regarding this exception have followed
an unsteady course. The incidental search exception was first thought
to allow the warrantless search of the person of an arrestee for evidence
contemporaneously with his arrest.' 64  Eventually, the permissible
scope of a search incidental to arrest was expanded to allow searches
of the premises in which the arrest was made for weapons as well as
evidence. 1 5 Reacting to the increasingly broad permissible scope, the
Court for a short time imposed a strict practicability limitation upon the
incidental search doctrine, allowing incidental searches only when there
was insufficient opportunity to obtain a search warrant prior to making
the arrest.16  However, this restriction was short-lived, and after its
demise the commentators suggested that the search-incident exception
had swallowed the warrant requirement.'0 7  Given both the demise of
161. United.States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
143 (1972); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
162. See Murray & Aitken, supra note 37, at 110.
163. 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
164. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 60 (1950); Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145, 165 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 158 (1925) (dictum); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (dic-
tum). United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), and its companion case, Gustaf-
son v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973), were the first cases in which the Supreme Court
squarely considered the permissible scope of an incidental search of a person, rather than
premises. See text accompanying notes 186-92 infra.
165. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950); Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145, 151 (1947); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927); Agnello
v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925) (dictum); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 158 (1925) (dictum).
166. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705, 708 (1948); Go-Bart Importing
Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357-58 (1931).
167. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950) (relevant test is not
whether reasonable to get warrant but whether search reasonable). See, e.g., Player,
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 5 GA. L. REv. 269, 285-86 (1971); Murray & Aitken,
supra note 37, at 114.
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the practicability test and the broad permissible scope of incidental
searches of premises of the arrestee, the rule, that searches must be
made pursuant to a warrant, except when made as incidents of lawful
arrests, was in danger of reading instead that "searches may be made
without warrants except when no one on the premises has been ar-
rested."'"" With Chimel v. California,'9 the Court chose to review
this state of incidental search law.
In Chimel police, armed with an arrest warrant, arrested the de-
fendant in his home for burglary. A thorough search of the premises
revealed incriminating evidence. In invalidating the search, the Court
set down the definitive rule regarding the permissible scope of inci-
dental searches: a search for weapons or evidence incident to a lawful
arrest must be limited to the person of the arestee "and the area
'within his immediate control'-construing that phrase to mean the area
from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence.' 170 Chimel thus turned on a redefinition of the incidental
search exception, but at the same time it gave new life -to the prac-
ticability test of Trupiano v. United States,171 at least insofar as searches
beyond the person and reach of the arrestee.172
C. Pre-Chimel Incidental Search Law and Automobiles
The incidental search doctrine, like all warrant exceptions, is
premised on the need for immediate action occasioned by an emer-
gency situation-the need for an immediate search, arising from the
lawful custodial arrest of a suspect, to prevent the destruction or re-
moval of evidence, injury to the arresting officer, or the escape of the
168. T. TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 45 (1969). See
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145
(1947).
169. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
170. Id. at 763. In reaching this conclusion the Court overruled two earlier cases.
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145
(1947). The Court chose to limit the search-incident exception by redefining the rea-
sonable scope of "incidental" to extend only to searches of the person and areas within
his immediate reach rather than imposing a strict warrant requirement on all incidental
searches. After Chimel, warrantless searches extending beyond this narrowly defined
area can be justified only by a warrant exception other than the incidental-to-arrest rule;
however, as to searches sufficiently contemporaneous to the arrest and restricted in scope
to qualify as an incidental search, the Court made no clear statement regarding what
effect the absence of a warrant, when there was time to obtain one, would have on the
reasonableness of the search. See Player, supra note 167, at 289-90.
171. 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
172. See text accompanying note 166 supra.
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offender. Mindful of this fact, the Court in Preston v. United States"'
held -that the post-arrest warrantless search of the impounded car of
a suspect charged with vagrancy could not be justified as incidental to
his arrest because, being remote in time and place, it was not contemp-
oraneous with the arrest. Moreover, once officials obtained custody
of -the suspects and their car, there was no danger of evidence being
destroyed or weapons being drawn from the vehicle; therefore, the
emergency justifying a warrantless incidental search had disappeared,
and so had the right to search. 1 4
Within three years, in Cooper v. California,175 the Court approved
a warrantless automobile search that seemed even more remote in time
and place than had been the one in Preston. The Court emphasized
that the seizure of the car had been made pursuant to a state forfeiture
statute and that the subsequent search was closely related to the reason
for this seizure and the driver's arrest. The Court made it clear that
the overall reasonableness of the search, not the presence or absence
of a warrant, was the test. 171 Cooper thus made it unclear whether
the restrictions placed on the search in Preston remained viable, and
it proved that Preston did not indicate that the Court was returning to
the Trupiano practicability test.
After the Court's decision in Chimel, two years after Cooper and
five after Preston, the question posed was what effect the former case
would have on the latter two. Chimel clearly breathed new life into
Preston, specifically approving the holding in that case that the need
to seize weapons or destructible evidence is "absent where a search is
remote in time or place from the arrest."'17 Moreover, the limiting
redefinition of the permissible scope of an incidental search in Chimel
seemed inconsistent with a search such as that in Cooper, even though
the Court did not expressly overrule Cooper in Chimel.178 The only
173. 376 U.S. 364 (1964). For a fuller discussion of Preston as a warrantless prob-
able cause auto search case, see notes 58-67 and accompanying text supra.
174. Id. at 367-68. "Once an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search
made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not incident to the arrest." Id. at
367.
175. 386 U.S. 58 (1967). See notes 68-82 and accompanying text, supra.
176. Id. at 61-62; Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 368 (1964).
177. Chimel.v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764 (1969), quoting Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964). Subsequent cases have followed this interpretation
of Preston in Chinel regarding the permissible scope of searches of automobiles alleg-
edly made incidental to an arrest. See, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974);
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
178. While pointing out that Harris and Rabinowitz had been relied on decreasingly
as precedent, the Court nevertheless noted that Cooper remained as somewhat bother-
some authority. 395 U.S. at 768 n.15; id. at 768.
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basis upon which Cooper seemed justifiable after Chimel was that it
approved a search of a car, which police were required by law to seize
and keep in their custody for a considerable period of time, at least
for their own protection. 179
D. Post-Chimel Incidental Search Law and Automobiles
Following the decision in Chimel limiting the permissible scope
of incidental searches, many lower courts, relying on Chimel's reaf-
firmation of the holding in Preston, have held the Chimel restrictions
applicable to automobile searches justified as incidental to arrest.180
However, at least one, and possibly three, recent Supreme Court cases
may cast doubt on this application of Chimel.
In Adams v. Williams,' a police officer, in response to a late-
night tip of a known informant that a man seated in a nearby car in
a high-crime area of the city was carrying narcotics and had a gun at
his waist, approached the suspect's car and told him to open the door.
Instead, the man rolled down the window, whereupon the officer
reached into the car and removed a loaded revolver from his waistband.
The defendant was then arrested on a firearms charge, and a warrant-
less search of the defendant's person and his car was made, revealing
drugs on his person and other weapons in the car. The Supreme Court
upheld the search of both the arrestee and his automobile. 182
While the Adams decision apparently allows the search of the en-
tire car as incidental to the arrest, the case is questionable precedent
for this assertion. The Court, while finding the initial actions of the
officer reasonable under the stop-and-frisk rationale of Terry v.
Ohio, 83 did not specifically approve the search of the entire car under
the incident-to-arrest rule, and in fact cited traditional "automobile
exception" cases on this point.18 1 Moreover, the evidence discovered on
defendant's person was probably sufficient to convict him of the fire-
179. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
180. See cases cited note 177 supra. See also United States v. Green, 465 F.2d 620
(D.C. Cir. 1972); Application of Kiser, 419 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir. 1969); People v. Su-
perior Ct., 3 Cal. 3d 807, 91 Cal. Rptr. 729, 478 P.2d 449 (1970); State v. Pettit, 20
Ohio App. 2d 170, 252 N.E.2d 325 (1969); Gonzales v. State, 507 P.2d 1277 (Okla.
Cr. 1973). See generally 23 OKLA. L. Rav. 447 (1970).
181. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
182. Id. at 144-49.
183. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
184. 407 U.S. at 147-49, citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) and
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)..
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arms charge. Therefore, the Court's reference to the validity of the
automobile search, as opposed to the search of defendant's person, was
dictum.""5
In the recent case of United States v. Robinson"" the Supreme
Court considered the permissible scope of a search of the person of
a driver placed under lawful custodial arrest for a traffic violation. The
Court upheld both the -thorough search of the traffic offender's person
and the search of a cigarette package, subsequently found to contain
heroin, located in his coat pocket.' 7  The lawful custodial arrest itself
was held sufficient to establish the right to make a full incidental search
of the person; therefore, whether, there was further justification for the
search, such as the probability that the arrestee was armed or that he
had on his person fruits or evidence of the crime for which the arrest
was made need not be litigated in each case.'
Although the search in Robinson did not extend to any part of
defendant's car, the fact that the Court allowed the examination of the
cigarette package after its removal from ,the arrestee's person raises the
questions whether Robinson impliedly provides for searches of an
arrestee's car as well as his person incidental to his arrest and whether
the Supreme Court will simply refuse to consider such an automobile
search independent of the incidental search of the person. Several
aspects of the case mitigate against such an interpretation. First, the
discussion and holding of the case focus primarily on the search of the
person of the arrestee. Additionally, the protective rationale80 of the
185. See Comment, Criminal Procedure-Stop and Frisk Warrantless Car Searches-
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), 50 DENvER L.J. 243, 258 (1973).
186. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). The companion case to Robinson, Gustafson v. Florida,
414 U.S. 260 (1973), involved facts similar to those in Robinson. The Court, relying
on Robinson, also upheld the Gustafson search. Only Robinson will be discussed spe-
cifically in this comment.
187. 414 U.S. at 235-36. Defendant conceded that the officer had probable cause
to arrest him for driving after revocation of his operator's license. The officer actually
took defendant into custody rather than merely issuing him a citation. Id. at 220-21.
The Court specifically held that in the case of any lawful custodial arrest a full search
of the arrestee's person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment, but also a reasonable search under that amendment. Id. at 235-36.
188. Id. at 227-29, 234-35.
189. The Court premised its decision primarily on the need of the officer to search
the person of the arrestee for weapons in the interest of his own safety and rejected
the argument that a protective frisk of the suspect's outer clothing should be sufficient
in cases of custodial traffic arrests to accomplish this purpose unless it disclosed a basis
for a more thorough search, which then, but only then, would be allowed. The Court
distinguished the stop-and-frisk cases, such as Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), on the
grounds that those cases involved brief encounters with suspicious persons on less than
probable cause, which involved much less danger to the policeman than placing a defer '.
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case would not seem to support a search of the arrestee's car as inci-
dental to his arrest particularly where the arrest is for a traffic offense,
and in any case where the offender has been removed from his car,
since any search conducted after this time would not be necessary to
protect the safety of the arresting officer. Moreover, the Court, in al-
lowing the search of the cigarette package, may simply have been anti-
cipatorily employing the reasoning, enunciated four months after Rob-
inson in United States v. Edwards,190 that "it is difficult to perceive
what is unreasonable about the police examining and holding as evi-
dence those personal effects of the accused that they already have in
their lawful custody as the result of a lawful arrest."'191 If so, it would
seem that the arresting officer could not search the automobile inci-
dental to the arrest unless they also lawfully seized it along with the
driver. Even if they could and did lawfully impound the car, absent
independent probable cause to search the vehicle, which would validate
the search under the "automobile exception," the search would be law-
ful only if made for a legitimate non-evidentiary purpose. 19
2
Notwithstanding possible readings of Adams and Robinson sug-
gesting the contrary, it is unlikely after Chimel that the Supreme Court
would uphold a warrantless search of an entire automobile solely under
the incident-to-arrest exception. Certainly, when the offender has
been separated from his car, the incidental-search doctrine should not
be applied because the arrestee could neither destroy nor conceal ev-
dence inside the car nor procure a weapon from within the car. Even
when the arrest is actually affected while the suspect is still inside the
vehicle, the scope of any search incidental to that arrest after Chimel
should be restricted to that part of the car within ,the reach of the
arrestee in which he could reasonably be expected to conceal danger-
ous weapons or evidence.
IV. BENIGN-PURPOSE INVENTORY SEIZURES AND SEARCHES
OF AUTOMOBILES
A. Background
In addition to seizing and searching vehicles in connection with
the suspected criminal activity of their occupants, police in recent years
ant under full-custody arrest on probable cause and transporting him to the station
house. Id. at 227-28.
190. 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
191. Id. at 806 (emphasis added).
192. Nakell, Search of the Person and His Cigarette Package Incident to a Traffic
Arrest, at 10, 1974 ( unpublished manuscript).
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have often found it necessary to seize and search vehicles in situations
unconnected with violations of the criminal statutes. For example,
vehicles have been seized and taken into temporary police custody for
such benign, non-evidentiary purposes as removing from the highway
a disabled or abandoned vehicle constituting a nuisance, towing an
automobile after a parking violation, and impounding a vehicle for safe-
keeping after the driver's arrest.193 In such cases the police may also
conduct inventory searches of the automobiles pursuant to statutory or
departmental authorization, the purpose of which purportedly is not to
look for incriminating evidence or contraband, but to catalogue and re-
move the contents of -the automobile to a secure place, to protect the
arrestee's property from damage or theft and to prevent false claims
against the police for loss or damage to the arrestee's property while
his car is in custody.194 The Supreme Court has decided at least four
cases that may be considered in the context of benign purpose non-
evidentiary inventory seizures and searches of automobiles.
B. Preston, Cooper, and Harris
Preston v. United States'" can be viewed as involving an inven-
tory search defined in its broadest sense-a search of an arrestee's car
after his arrest and removal of his car to an impoundment lot or garage.
However, the Court decided the case primarily on the grounds that the
search was "too remote in time or place -to have been made as inciden-
tal to arrest."''9  Although the case could be read broadly as prohibit-
ing all post-arrest searches of automobiles in police custody, including
inventories, later cases have limited the Preston holding to searches
justified under the incident-to-arrest rule. 1 9 7
Cooper v. California"8 involved the warrantless search of an auto-
mobile a week after its owner was arrested on drug charges and his
car impounded in a police garage pursuant to a state forfeiture statute.
It has been suggested that Cooper, which upheld the search, may stand
for the proposition that police may inventory the contents of an automo-
bile that is retained in custody for a substantial period of time to protect
193. See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). See also cases cited
notes 18-19 supra.
194. See cases cited notes 18-19 supra.
195. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
196. Id. at 368.
197. See. e.g.. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
198. 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
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themselves from liability for loss of items stored within the car.199
However, the value of Cooper as precedent for -the validity of inventory
searches is limited for several reasons. First, the Court in Cooper em-
phasized the close connection between the reasons for the arrest and
the seizure and search of the car. This emphasis suggests the presence
of probable cause, which would obscure the relationship between mere
custody and a search for non-evidentiary protective purposes that char-
acterizes the traditional inventory search and seizure case. Moreover,
the initial seizure in Cooper was made pursuant to a state statute that
also required the police to retain custody of the vehicle until a forfeiture
was declared or a release ordered, so that the police in effect had a
possessory interest in the car and could deny possession of it even to
the owner. This situation is also unlike the usual inventory situation
where the car is only temporarily in custody of the police, who have
no right to retain the car after the arrested owner's release. Perhaps
Cooper is best read, therefore, as allowing -the police to search an auto-
mobile "with or without probable cause, if they have a continuing right
to possess it."200 Despite the apparent inapplicability of this interpreta-
tion of Cooper as a justification for inventories made of cars temporarily
held by police under circumstances in which the custodians have no
continuing possessory interest in the vehicles, a majority of lower courts
that have considered the issue have nevertheless broadly extended the
Cooper rationale to all validly impounded vehicles. 201
199. LaFave, Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court: Further Ventures into
the "Quagmire", 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 9, 24 n.57 (1972), citing Cooper v. California, 386
U.S. 58, 61-62 (1967): "It would be unreasonable to hold that the police, having to
retain the car in their custody for such a length of time, had no right, even for their
own protection, to search it." (emphasis added). However an inventory conducted a
week after impoundment is scarcely consistent with a need to protect against false
claims. And Cooper's car was hardly an inherently dangerous object threatening the
physical safety of the police. See note 82 supra.
200. Note, 87 HARV. L. REV., supra note 42, at 846 (emphasis added). The Court's
reference to self protection may indicate approval of a search furthering such a police
possessory interest, which would not depend on the presence of a probable cause. Id.
at 847. It has been suggested that such a reading of Cooper makes the citizen's privacy
rights turn on possession of the automobile in circumstances in which there is no oppor-
tunity for the citizen to protect his privacy interests, unlike the case of a voluntary trans-
fer of his car, and that the rule in Cooper should be changed to provide the opportunity
for a pre-search reclamation of the automobile's contents in cases of seizures pursuant
to forfeiture statutes. Id. at 847-48. The proper reading of Cooper, however, remains
uncertain. Compare Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 445-47 (1973) (Rehnquist,
J.,), with id. at 452-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Dyke v. Taylor Implement
Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 220-21 (1968) (White, J.).
201. Comment, The Inventory Search of an Impounded Vehicle, 48 CHi.-KENT L.
REv. 48, 52 (1971). For a discussion of more narrow extensions of Cooper to inventory
searches see id. at 49-52.
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In Harris v. United States202 the Supreme Court for the first time
had before it a case that arguably presented the issue of the constitu-
tionality of a warrantless inventory search of an impounded automobile
absent a forfeiture statute. The defendant's car was observed leaving
the scene of a robbery, and after the automobile was traced to him,
he was arrested and his car towed to the police impoundment lot. Pur-
suant to a departmental regulation, the arresting officer conducted an
inventory of the automobile for the purposes of tagging the vehicle for
identification and listing and removing its contents for safekeeping.
Having completed the inventory, the officer opened the door to roll up
the car window. The officer found a registration card in the doorjamb
of the vehicle implicating the accused. 0 3
In upholding the seizure of the card and its use against the defend-
ant at trial, the Court expressly declined to decide the inventory issue,
stating that "[t]he admissibility of evidence found as a result of a
search under the police regulation [inventory] is not presented by this
case."20  Instead the Court found that the officer discovered the card
while performing a justified non-evidentiary function solely for the pro-
tection of the car and not for the purpose of securing incriminating evi-
dence, and therefore, on the basis of the plain view doctrine, upheld
the seizure and use of the card in defendant's prosecution. -'
Given that the Court in Harris went out of its way to avoid the
inventory issue, ultimately deciding the case in terms of the traditional
plain-view exception, Harris stands as uncertain precedent for the rule
that inventory searches are reasonable under the fourth amendment as
a separate exception to the warrant requirement. However, that case
has been relied on by several lower courts to justify inventory
searches..206
C. Cady v. Dombrowski-Closer to the Mark?
In Dombrowski20 the police arrested an off-duty policeman for
202. 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (per curiam).
203. Id. at 234-36. Although the Court's opinion suggests that the card was seized
during the actual inventory, the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia, referred to by the Supreme Court, id. at 236, indicates that the card was discov-
ered after the inventory had been completed. Harris v. United States, 370 F.2d 477,
478 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
204. 390 U.S. at 236.
205. See id. at 236-37 (Douglas, J., concurring).
206. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 458 P.2d 960, 961 (9th Cir. 1972); State
v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 275 n.6. 444 P.2d 517, 51.9-20 n.6 (1968).
207. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U S. 433 (19731 (5-4 decision).
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drunken driving, after a late night accident that 'totally disabled his
rented car. Believing that the arrestee was required to carry his
service revolver at all times, the police made a cursory search of Dom-
browski and his car at the scene of the arrest but found no gun. Two
hours after the car was towed to a private garage and Dombrowski had
been booked and taken to a hospital for treatment, one of the arresting
officers returned to the garage to continue the search for the defend-
ant's gun. In the process he discovered blood-stained items in the
trunk of the vehicle that led to Dombrowski's conviction for murder.08
Relying on the federal district court's finding that the search in
Dombrowski was not conducted to discover incriminating evidence, the
Court upheld the warrantless search of the car's trunk on the grounds
that it was made in the discharge of the police department's non-inves-
tigative "community care-taking functions" and was motivated out of
a "concern for the safety of the general public who might be endan-
gered if an intruder removed a revolver from the trunk of the ve-
hicle. '20 9 Seeking to justify the warrantless search of Dombrowski's
admittedly immobile car, Mr. Justice Rehnquist cited the large volume
of non-evidentiary "care-taking" functions performed 'by local police
with respect to automobiles. Then he stated that the constitutional
distinction between automobiles and houses, originally based on the am-
bulatory nature of vehicles, now also stemmed from "the fact that ex-
tensive, and often noncriminal contact with automobiles will bring local
officials in 'plain view' of evidence, fruits ,or instrumentalities of a crime,
or contraband."210 Emphasizing that the police had exercised a form of
valid custody over the vehicle, the Court compared Dombrowski to
Cooper and Harris, two cases in which vehicle mobility also was not
present, and concluded:
In Harris the justification for the initial intrusion into the vehicle
was to safeguard the owner's property, and in Cooper it was to
guarantee the safety of the custodians. Here the justification,
while different, was as immediate and constitutionally reasonable
as those in Harris and Cooper: concern .for the safety of the gen-
eral public who might be endangered if an intruder removed a re-
volver from the trunk of a vehicle.211
Dombrowski lends itself to at least two interpretations apart from
its value as precedent justifying warrantless inventory searches. First,
208. Id. at 435-39.
209. Id. at 447.
210. Id. at 442.
211. Id. at 447.
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the case may stand for the proposition that the warrant requirement
will no longer apply to automobiles. This reading is suggested by the
Court's expansion of the constitutional distinction for fourth amend-
ment purposes between cars and houses, which anticipates the more
explicit language in Cardwell that automobiles are places of a lesser
expectation of privacy and therefore warrant only secondary fourth
amendment protection.2 12  The Court's attempt to distinguish Coolidge
on the "private" versus "public" place rationale, which was later enun-
ciated in Cardwell, also supports this view of Dombrowski.213 Finally,
the implied suggestion in the Court's holding that any purpose "as
reasonable as" those in Cooper, Harris, and Dombrowski may signal
a return to the Rabinowitz rule that the practicability of obtaining a
warrant has no bearing on the reasonableness of a search.214
Secondly, Dombrowski possibly indicates that the Court will
simply not apply the warrant requirement to searches conducted for
non-evidentiary purposes. This suggestion is supported by the Court's
emphasis on the benign motive for the search in Dombrowski. Such
a rationale is analogous to the Court's administrative search cases, but
even here a warrant has been required, although on less than probable
cause.
215
Dombrowski may certainly be read as precedent supporting war-
rantless auto inventories. The Court's repeated emphasis on the be-
nign purpose of the search lends some support to that line of cases hold-
ing that inventories are simply not fourth amendment searches. 211
212. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974).
213. 413 U.S. at 446-48; 417 U.S. at 593. The Court also distinguished Preston
by limiting its applicability to searches alleged to have been made incidentally to the
driver's arrest.
214. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950).
215. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (1967). Camara held that
a person could not be criminally prosecuted for refusing to permit a housing inspector
to conduct an inspection of his home pursuant to a city housing code providing for war-
rantless inspections. The Court required a warrant but allowed one to issue on "area
wide" probable cause to inspect even though probable cause as to the particular house
did not exist.
216. See, e.g., Fagundes v. United States, 340 F.2d 673 (1st Cir. 1965); People v.
Sullivan, 29 N.Y.2d 69, 272 N.E.2d 464, 323 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1971). This view finds
some support in the recent decision of Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), in which
the Court held that a home visit by a welfare social worker was not a fourth amendment
search. Id. at 317. However, Wyman alternatively held that, if the visit was a search,
it was reasonable. Id. at 318-24. Moreover, Wyman can be distinguished on the
grounds that it involved a program historically subject to government regulation, and
that, unlike Camara, refusal to admit the investigator without a warrant could not result
in criminal charges but only in a suspension of welfare benefits. Furthermore, this view
imposes a strict reading on the word "search" that is inconsistent with the Court's rea-
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However, Dombrowski declined to decide this issue and, assuming
a search, still found Cooper and Harris controlling. The better
approach would be to consider even benign purpose inventories as
searches within the fourth amendment, and then determine whether
the warrant requirement should be dispensed with and whether the
subsequent warrantless search is reasonable.
217
Dombrowski implies that the subjective intent of the officer in
conducting an inventory will be determinative of the need -for a war-
rant.218  Thus when there can be no doubt that the inventory was made
for a non-evidentiary purpose, such as when an inventory is made of
a car towed from a no-parking zone, no warrant should be required.
Cases involving inventories conducted following the driver's arrest on
charges not related to the automobile itself will pose a closer ques-
tion,219 especially when the law enforcement agency involved routinely
inventories all impounded vehicles. 220  But at least when it is clear that
the inventory was conducted for evidentiary purposes, the warrant re-
quirement should be enforced.22'
Dombrowski also may be read as supporting the reasoning of those
cases in which the warrant requirement has been dispensed with and
the resultant inventory has been held a reasonable search designed to
protect the owner's property from damage or theft and the police from
physical harm or liability for lost or stolen property.222 In equating the
need to search for protection of the public safety with the need to
search for protection of the owner and the police, the holding in Dom-
soning in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), in which the Court stated that "the sounder
course is to recognize that the Fourth Amendment governs all intrusions by agents of
the public upon personal security," id. at 17-18 n.15, and does not comport with the
statement in Camara that "[ilt is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his
private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual
is suspected of criminal behavior." Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967).
217. See, e.g., United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1973); State v. Cris-
cola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 517 (1968); Cabbler v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 520,
184 S.E.2d 781 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1073 (1972).
218. 413 U.S. at 443.
219. See, e.g., United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1973); St. Clair v.
State, 1 Md. App. 605, 232 A.2d 565 (1967).
220. See, e.g., United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1973); State v.
Montague, 73 Wash. 2d 381, 438 P.2d 571 (1968).
221. See, e.g., Pigford v. United States, 273 A.2d 837 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971) (auto
left unlocked and unguarded after purported safekeeping inventory).
222. See, e.g., United States v. Kelehar, 470 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Pennington, 441 F.2d 249 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 845 (1971); State v. All,
17 N.C. App. 284, 193 S.E.2d 770, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973); State v. Criscola,
21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 517 (1968); Cabbler v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 520, 184
S.E.2d 781 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1073 (1972).
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browski implies that all are reasonable justifications for a warrantless
search. However, Dombrowski can be distinguished from Cooper and
Harris on several grounds. Cooper relied on both the close connection
between the reason for the search and the reason for the arrest, -and
the relationship between the reason for the seizure and the reason for
the search. In Dombrowski the search was clearly unrelated to the
crime for which the defendant was arrested, and the reasons for the
seizure and impoundment were unrelated to the reason for the arrest
and the object of the search. Moreover, since the car was not being
held as evidence and there being no forfeiture involved, the police had
no right or obligation to retain the car beyond the time that Dombrow-
ski was released or made other arrangements for the vehicle. Thus
the need for a self-protective search seems weaker in Dombrowski.223
Harris turned on a finding by the Court that there was no search,
whereas Dombrowski assumed a search occurred. Furthermore, Harris,
unlike Dombrowski, involved no intrusion into a securable area of
the car. Thus no significant privacy interests were infringed by the
initial intrusion in Harris, which was not the case in Dombrowski. The
"narrow circumstances" in Harris in which a warrant was not required
were not present in Dombrowski.2 24
Finally, Dombrowski can be distinguished from the more typical
inventory search in two respects. First, the police in Dombrowski had
probable cause to believe a specific item was inside the car, and they
were looking only for it. This is unlikely in most inventory situations.
Secondly, Dombrowski involved the seizure and search of a disabled
vehicle constituting a nuisance on the highway under where the driver
was intoxicated and later comatose. In the more usual situation, the
driver could likely make arrangements for the safekeeping of the ve-
hicle and its contents himself, if he were allowed the opportunity. 225
These considerations suggest not only that Dombrowski may be
uncertain inventory-search precedent, but also that some of the tradi-
tional justifications relied on to sustain the reasonableness of warrant-
less inventory searches need to be reexamined. First, barring unusual
circumstances, inventory searches hardly seem necessary for the phys-
ical safety of the custodians. Secondly, although claims against police
departments for damaged or stolen property are frequently filed, it
223. Note, Cady v. Dombrowski: The Demise of Coolidge, 35 U. PriT. L. REv.
712, 719-20 (1974). See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
224. Note, 35 U. PTrr. L. REv., supra note 223, at 717-18.
225. United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468, 471, 474-77 (8th Cir. 1973).
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would seem that police or other impoundment custodians are at most
involuntary bailees who are required to exercise only minimal care for
the safety of their bailments. Thus, as far as legal liability is con-
cerned, a constitutional rule that police can do no more than roll up
the windows and lock the doors of impounded cars should be conclu-
sive.228 Finally, although the inventory process may provide greater
protection for the owner's property than rolling up the windows and
locking the doors of his car, it also means a substantially greater intru-
sion into the privacy of his automobile. Moreover, there may be no
property in the car, and, if there is, in most instances the custodians
of the car can locate the owner, who usually can take whatever steps
he desires to protect his own property. Furthermore, car owners can
insure against property loss but not against a loss of privacy.227
Weighing the interests of both the police and the citizen that are
involved in an inventory search, it has been suggested that warrantless
inventories should be allowed only in special circumstances, such as
where the police reasonably believe that the car contains protectable
property and the driver cannot be located or is in a condition which
precludes his arranging for the protection of his car and its contents. 2 8
This rule would be consistent with a narrow reading of Dombrowski,2 '
and seems preferable in that it "would bring inventory searches into
line with the general corpus of fourth amendment law."
2 0
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of the United States recently stated that "very
little . . . we might say . . .can usefully refine the language of the
[fourth] Amendment .. . in order to evolve some detailed formula
for judging [automobile search] cases .... ,,231 This is not necessarily
the case. The Court could best accommodate individual privacy
rights and police investigatory needs by adhering to the following
suggestions. First, the Court should apply the Carroll automobile
exception narrowly, following the rule in Coolidge that Carroll is applic-
226. Id. at 474-77; cf. Mozzetti v. Superior Ct., 4 Cal. 3d 699, 709-10, 484 P.2d
84, 90-91, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412, 418-19 (1971) (en banc).
227. See United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468, 474-77 (8th Cir. 1973); Note, 87
HARv. L. REv., supra note 42, at 852-53.
228. United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468, 471, 474-77 (Sth Cir. 1973); Note,
87 HIARv. L. RPv., supra note 42, at 853.
229. See United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468, 471 (8th Cir. 1973); Note, 35 U.
Prrr. L. REv., supra note 223, at 723-24. But see id. at 722, 724.
230. Note, 87 HARv. L. Rv.. supra note 42, at 853.
231. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 448 (1973).
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able only to those cases in which a moving automobile is halted on the
open road by a law enforcement officer who has probable cause to
search the vehicle.
Secondly, warrantless searches of automobiles, which have been
impounded after the driver's arrest, should be allowed only in circum-
stances in which an immediate search at the scene of the arrest would
have been proper under Carroll-where the car has been seized in
flight on the open road on probable cause to search. Better, perhaps,
would be to apply Mr. Justice Harlan's view in his dissent in Cham-
bers232 to such post-arrest, post-impoundment situations, permitting sta-
tion-house detention of the automobile on probable cause but no search
until a warrant is obtained. Such a rule would have the advantages
of respecting the fourth amendment commands and furnishing greater
protection for individual rights, while providing for, rather than hinder-
ing, effective law enforcement.
The restrictions placed on incidental searches of premises in
Chimel2 13 should be applied to warrantless searches of automobiles al-
legedly conducted incidentally to the driver's arrest. This is necessary
to prevent the use of the incident-to-arrest doctrine to circumvent the
fourth amendment when vehicles are the objects to be searched.
Finally, the Supreme Court, when it chooses to decide squarely
the constitutionality of inventory searches, should treat them as searches
within the fourth amendment, and determine on a case-by-case basis
whether the warrant requirement shoild be dispensed with and
whether the resultant search is reasonable. As a general rule, inven-
tories should be allowed without a warrant only when police officers
have reason to believe that the car contains securable property and the
owner of the automobile cannot be found or is so incapacitated that he
cannot provide for the safety of his car and its contents. If the owner
can be found and prefers that police secure his property, an inventory
would also be permissible, provided that the owner's consent is legally
binding and he signs a release discharging the custodians from liability
for lost or damaged property. However, even where inventories can
properly be conducted, the scope of the search should at most extend
232. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 55 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring and dis-
senting). Justice Harlan favored the approach of Preston that it was more reasonable
and less intrusive upon individual privacy temporarily to immobilize the car for the short
time necessary to obtain a warrant than to conduct a full warrantless search of the entire
vehicle. Id. at 67.
233. See text accompanying notes 170-72 supra.
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to those areas of the car that are in plain view and that one might
reasonably believe contain valuables. Locked suitcases and the like
should be removed and listed on the inventory but not opened except
in unusual circumstances. Perhaps police should be required to do no
more than lock the car doors and windows. Any incriminating evi-
dence discovered in the course of a properly restricted inventory should
be admissible at later prosecutions, but when the inventory was con-
ducted for an evidentiary rather than a benign purpose, the search
should be invalidated if made without a warrant.2 4
Charles Evans Hughes once said, "We are under a Constitution,
but the Constitution is what the judges say it is."2 "S Regarding the
fourth amendment as it applies to warrantless seizures and searches of
automobiles, the judges are finding it difficult to declare the laws. The
law of automobile search and seizure thus remains "something less than
a seamless web," and the constitutional guarantee against "unreason-
able searches and seizures" is undermined as a result.
ICHAEL D. WEST
234. See Miles & Wefing, supra note 27, at 143-44; Note, 87 HAXv. L. REV., supra
note 42, at 853.
235. 7 AKRON L. REV. 343, 351-52 (1974), quoting ADDRESSES OF CHARLES EVANS
HuGHES 185 (2d ed. 1916).
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